
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PART I



## MEMORANDUN OF CONTERSATION

Date: July 23, 1962

Time: 4:15 p.m.

Place: US Mission Arnex. Geneva

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## Participants:

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United States Germany

The Secretary Poreign Minister Schroder
Nr. Kohler State Secretary Caratens
Nr. Holloway Mr. Kusterer, Interpreter

Subject: Talks with Growyko on Berlin

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S/S Assembasay BOME
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S/B Assembasay LONCE
FUR Assembasy LONCEM
GER-2 US Mission EFRIIN

Percign Minister Schroeder called on the Secretary by appointment just before his departure for Bonn to discuss the recent talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Green's on the Berlin problem.

The Secretary opened by saying that Grouyle seemed less insistent in the July 22 talk than he had in the July 21 talk. However, the Secretary constitued that we sumt be careful not to exaggrate this atmosphere. Frav.a had essyind some hard line articles, which had been published while the Secretary has been in Geneva, and we must definitely consider Fravia as part of the atmosphere. The Secretary said that to him an important fact had been that Gramph had avoided as assess to the Secretary's direct question whether the presence of Western troops in Berlin and their access thereto would in any way be affected by signature of a peace treaty with the GR by the Soviets and some other states. But, both times Grouyle fell back on the formulation that in such a case the Western powers would have to make arrangements with a

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sovereign der, not the UNSE, on all transe of interest to them including access. This is eased to indicate atther that Griegho had no instructions to go broid file forbilation or that the Soviet Quovernment has yet to make up its sind what to do. As to the question of what's next, Grosyto had responded to the Secretary's suggestion to think about the conversation overnight by inviting the Secretary the next worning to come to lunch on July 28. The Secretary said that Grouyto is sware that the Secretary plans to be in Washington to give a dinner for Frince Souvenne on July 26.

The Secretary said he also wanted to tell the Foreign Minister that as far as he hase stories appearing in the German press predicting an imminent suggest secting were pure speculation. There has been no discussion in the convergations thus far of a suggest meeting.

Minister Schroeder said that he had seen the press today, and had tried to give the impression that the Soviets had not made a strong stand at Genve, particularly in that they had set no desalline for signature of the peace treaty. He had hoped by this interview to counter the impression which the Soviets seemed to be making on world opinion that it is the West which is under pressure.

The Foreign Minister also said that the report of the briefing given to the Ambassadorial group in Washington on the last talk by the Secretary and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on July 12 and the report he had received of the July 22 talk had raised a problem for him. He was second concerned that the impression will be created that there is only the troop issue outstanding and that once this is solved other matters such as border issues, nuclear weapons, etc., will automatically be settled. This would create a pressure on the West to compressie on the troop issue because it would suggest that Berlin is the only element in an agreement which is lacking in a solution. The Soviets may be leading us in that direction by their apparently reasonable proposals to leave the Western troops for a period of four years, to be reduced by a similarly reasonable formula over this period. The Minister thought this was secentary of a psychological teatic of the Soviets and that it seemed to be having some effect.

The Secretary replied that the Soviets are using some of Hitler's tentism against us by suggesting that if just one more concession is granted, e.g. Smittenland, Austria, etc., this will lead to a final solution. The Secretary wanted to stress that there had been no serious and systematic discussions with the Sovieta on other matters commerced with Berlin. They already have for example that their concept of a ben on nuclear weapons to solitizateral groups was unacceptable. They must also be exare that we see the idea of a MATO-Marser Part non-aggression treaty as only coming at the end of a very long road. The Secretary said that the dangers involved for us in appearing to argue only on the Strict takes suggest to him 1845.00

review our bdittical planning to see if we periage might bring about a compaign for removed expluses on such matters on self-determination.

The Secretary and he also wented to sention his feeling that we should review our military planning in connection with this political review. In this political review. In thought the planning in verious fields should be sore closely interrelated. Some of the military planning seems to be rather abstract, based perhaps too much on a feeling that this is "scowthing that may happen, but which does not seem real at this mement. He also felt that we must look more into the question of economic counterweature. The trade of Eastern Europe with the West now comes to 35 billion annually. The whole question of planning and counterweatures that the reviewed particularly the question of sequence of actions because in the event of crisis there would probably be little time for consultation. When the Foreign Hinister observed that Ehrushohew would be on leave ment month, the Secretary reminded him that he had been on leave last August 13.

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